Abstract. In this paper, we propose a new variant of indistinguishabilitybased security model for the RFID authentication protocol, which allows an adversary to obtain an authentication result and secret key of a target tag. Ng et al. showed that symmetric-key based RFID authentication protocols cannot be resilient to the above information leakage simultaneously in the Paise-Vaudenay security model. We review the existing result and extend the Juels-Weis security model to satisfy these properties by using a suitable restriction. Moreover, we give two example protocols that satisfy the modified security model.
Introduction
The RFID authentication protocol is an authentication protocol in which an RFID reader communicates with RFID tags and authenticates them. This protocol is considered to be one of the most important techniques for construct the world of "Internet of Things", in which all objects automatically interact with each other with wireless communication [19] . However, many people worry about their privacy with RFID attached objects (e.g., CASPIAN). Therefore, the RFID authentication protocol requires that the identity of RFID tags should be kept secret (anonymity) and any transaction should not be linked (unlinkability), except from legitimate RFID readers.
Since 2003, many RFID authentication protocols have been investigated and several protocols have been shown to be insecure (see [5] ). The security of these protocols is evaluated by using a cryptographic security model and one of the goals of the RFID authentication protocol is to satisfy this model. The PaiseVaudenay security model [17] divides the privacy level into eight categories and these are roughly divided into four groups: whether a malicious adversary can obtain an authentication result or not (wide/narrow), and whether the internal secret key of the target tag is finally revealed or not (forward/weak). However, Ng et al. classified symmetric-key based RFID authentication protocols into four types and showed that these protocols only satisfy either narrow-forward privacy or wide-weak privacy [8] . In particular, their result showed that authentication protocols which have a key update mechanism and resynchronization property, satisfy only wide-weak privacy, which can be achieved by protocols in which the secret key is always fixed. Coisel and Martin suspected that the provable security level of the SK-based protocol [9] (which does not require any secret key update) and O-FRAP (key update mechanism is clearly shown) are equivalent [5] .
In this paper, we propose a variant of the Juels-Weis security model [11] to investigate a suitable security model for RFID authentication protocol. Our model allows an adversary to obtain an authentication result and the secret key of a target tag. Note that we cannot simply send the secret key to the adversary since the resulting model is not achievable. Instead, we add the rule that the reader and the target tags must properly execute a session before the adversary obtains the secret key of the target tag. If the current secret key is appropriately updated in an honest execution, the adversary cannot distinguish which tag communicated with the reader in the past executions. We show that O-FRAP [7] and a variant of the OSK protocol [15] satisfy the modified security model. Furthermore, we show another separation based on the classification in [8] in which the RFID tag can interact with the reader concurrently.
Preliminaries

Notations
We denote a set of k-bit string as {0,
evaluates the probability that the algorithm f outputs b on input a. We say that a probability P (k) is negligible in k if for any polynomials f it holds that P (k) ≤ 1/f (k) for sufficient large k.
Pseudo-random Generator
Let k be a security parameter. The pseudo-random generator is a deterministic algorithm g that takes as input 1 k and truly random secret x ∈ {0, 1} k and outputs g(x) which is computationally indistinguishable from random string y (|g(x)| > |x|). In this paper, we treat the expansion factor as k and consider pseudo-random generator g : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} 2k . The advantage of a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary A for pseudo-random generator g is defined
We split the above pseudo-random generator g and consider two functions (g 1 , g 2 ) such that the output of these functions are k-bit where y 1 = g 1 (x), y 2 = g 2 (x) and y 1 y 2 := g(x). Let x i := g i 2 (x 0 ) be i-round iterated function with input x 0 . When we consider y i := g 1 (x i ), Berbain et al. proved that the function G :
is also the pseudorandom generator [2] . In particular, they showed that for any PPT adversary A, there exists a PPT time algorithm B such that Adv
Pseudo-random Function
The pseudo-random function is a function that takes as input a truly random secret (seed) x ∈ {0, 1} k and k-bit string, which output is computationally indistinguishable from truly random function RF. The advantage of an adversary A against the pseudo-random function f : {0,
Security Model for RFID Authentication
The RFID authentication protocol is an authentication protocol between the RFID reader R and RFID tag t ∈ T . The RFID reader runs a setup algorithm Setup and generates a public parameter and secret key (pk, sk)
. The reader and each tag share a secret key in the symmetric-key based protocol. After the initialization, the reader and each tag communicate with each other in a wireless setting during the authentication phase. Finally, they output "accept" or "reject" as a result. Following the previous security models [11, 17] , we assume that the tag only performs the sequential session with the reader, though the reader can interact with a lot of tags concurrently. We consider an active adversary as one who can modify any communication message between the reader and tags.
The RFID authentication protocol requires correctness, security and privacy and many security models are provided to formalize them [1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 10, 11, 14, 17, 18] . In this paper, we omit detailed definitions for correctness and security since almost all security models commonly define them. Correctness means that the reader accepts the RFID tag when the session is completed and the communication message is not modified. Security requires that the reader reject the session when the communication is modified by the adversary. In the following, we concentrate on the definition of privacy in the security model, which we call the "privacy model".
Juels-Weis Privacy Model
Juels and Weis introduced an indistinguishability based privacy definition for the RFID authentication protocol in 2007 [10, 11] .
Consider the following experiment Exp
IND-b
Π,A (k) between adversary A := (A 1 , A 2 ) and a challenger in an RFID authentication protocol Π.
The adversary A can interact with the reader and many tags in T by using the oracle query {ReaderInit, Send, Corrupt, Result}. ReaderInit(1 k ) activates the session by the reader and A sends an arbitrary message m by using Send(t i , m) (t i ∈ T ). In addition, the secret key of the tag can be obtained by 
Definition 3. An RFID authentication protocol Π satisfies Juels-Weis privacy model if for any PPT adversary
A, Adv IND Π,A (k) is negligible in k.
Paise-Vaudenay Privacy Model
Paise and Vaudenay defined a simulation based privacy model for the RFID authentication protocol. In this model, the adversary can issue a {CreateTag, DrawTag, Free} query in addition to {ReaderInit, Send, Corrupt, Result} in the Juels-Weis privacy model. The CreateTag query registers a new free tag but this tag still cannot communicate with the reader. Instead, the DrawTag query converts the free tag into a virtual tag, which can interact with the reader (the adversary can input arbitrary tags and a distribution to transform the tag) and the Free query converts the virtual tag into the original free tag. This model considers a 4 × 2 matrix for the adversary's capabilities in order to classify the privacy level as follows. When we consider O 1 := {CreateTag, DrawTag, Free, Corrupt} and O 2 := {Launch, Send, Result}, wide-strong privacy is described by the following experiment against an RFID authentication protocol Π.
The adversary A can access the reader and tags with O 2 directly in the experiment on the left-side, but the right-side experiment requires a simulator S to simulate its interaction. Note that S can obtain arbitrary information corresponding to the O 1 query issued by A. The advantage of the adversary is defined by Adv
Definition 4. An RFID authentication protocol Π satisfies the Paise-Vaudenay privacy model if for any PPT adversary A, there exists an algorithm S such that Adv
Note that we can define the other privacy levels in a similar way. In particular, we focus mainly on wide-forward privacy and narrow-weak privacy in the PaiseVaudenay privacy model.
Recently, Moriyama et al. showed several relationships between Juels-Wies and Paise-Vaudenay privacy model [13] . But the strongest privacy level requires public key cryptography [16] and the weakest privacy model does not include any tag's corruption. The motivation of the paper is to investigate a suitable privacy model which a symmetric-key based protocol can satisfy the provably security. Type 0. Any secret key of the protocol is not updated. Type 1. The tag always updates the secret key whenever the session is executed. The tag does not authenticate the reader in these types of protocols. Type 2a. After the reader authenticates the tag, the secret key of the tag is updated when the tag authenticates the reader. Type 2b. Before the reader authenticates the tag, the secret key of the tag is updated. Different from Type 1, the tag authenticates the reader in this type of protocol. If the tag downgrades its secret key when the reader authentication fails (e.g., the tag keeps the early state of the secret key for this property), we call it the "type 2b protocol".
Desynchronization Problem in RFID Authentication
Type 0: Type 0 protocols do not support narrow-forward privacy since there is no key update mechanism. Consider the following steps to break narrow-forward privacy: Register two tags (t 0 , t 1 ) with the CreateTag query and generate one virtual tag with the DrawTag query with input (t 0 , t 1 ) and uniformly random distribution. Observe a session between the virtual tag and the reader, convert the virtual tag to the free tag with the Free query and obtain the secret keys with the Corrupt query . Then, the adversary easily checks which tag is communicated to the reader, which no simulator can do without a probability higher than 1/2. When t 0 is chosen by the second DrawTag query, the reader cannot resynchronize with the tag, so it outputs "reject". However, the reader accepts the virtual tag when t 1 is chosen by the query. Since the adversary can learn which tag is chosen, type 1 protocols cannot satisfy wide-weak privacy.
Type 2a: A key update algorithm for the tag is executed only if the tag authenticates the reader in the type 2a protocols. When the adversary modifies the communication messages from the reader and forces the tag to reject all sessions, the tag cannot update its secret key, so it executes all sessions with a fixed secret key. The adversary can learn which tag executes the session when the adversary issues the Corrupt query in the final step of the experiment. Therefore these protocols do not satisfy narrow-forward privacy.
Type 2b and 2b : In these types, the tag runs the key update algorithm before the reader. Type 2b protocols cannot satisfy wide-weak privacy since the secret key transition for these protocols is equivalent to that for the type 1 protocols, regardless of the reader authentication. When the authentication protocol is classified in type 2b , the adversary can fix the secret key of the tag when the communication message from the reader is erased and the adversary sends a random message. Eventually, the privacy level of the type 2b protocols is the same as that of the type 2a protocols (narrow-forward privacy failure).
This result shows that any symmetric key based RFID authentication protocol cannot satisfy both wide-weak privacy and narrow-forward privacy in the PaiseVaudenay privacy model. However, we consider that the privacy level of the type 2a and 2b protocols are not equivalent to type 0 protocols. The type 2a and 2b protocols clearly specify the key update/downgrade procedure to resynchronize the secret key and provide the notion of "forward-privacy".
The Modified Forward Privacy Model
In this section, we illustrate a variant of the Juels-Weis privacy model that allows the adversary to issue the Corrupt query to the challenge tags. Note that the Paise-Vaudenay privacy model does not explicitly define which and when a tag is considered to be the target. In contrast, the Juels-Weis privacy model is easy to modify since the interaction between the challenge tag and adversary is clear. The classification described in Section 4 is generally applied to the RFID authentication protocol. If we purposely add the Corrupt query during the anonymous access phase of this model, no symmetric key based RFID authentication protocol satisfies the modified model because the Result query is given to the adversary.
Instead, if the RFID tag can normally interact with the reader (this means the adversary only eavesdrops on the communication) and resynchronization is completed, the adversary cannot trace which tag interacts with the reader even when the current secret key of the tag is revealed (of course, we assume that the updated key is hard to invert).
Consider the following game between the challenger and adversary A := (A 1 , A 2 , A 3 ) based on the Juels-Weis privacy model. Let π R ← Execute(R, t) be one normal execution of the session between the reader and tag t, and π denotes the communication message.
The advantage of the adversary in the modified model is defined by Adv
We add the honest execution which the reader and tag communicate without the adversary's interruption. Instead, the adversary can issue the Corrupt query to target tags t * 0 and t * 1 after the honest execution from the original Juels-Weis privacy model. If the normal execution securely updates the secret key of the reader and tag, this results in the privacy of the challenge tags for the type 2a and 2b protocols. The adversary A 3 can obtain the secret key of the target tag and easily break the privacy for type 0 protocols (e.g., SK-based protocol [9, 5] ).
Definition 5. An RFID authentication protocol Π satisfies the modified JuelsWeis privacy model if for any PPT adversary
In this paper, we only concentrate on the modification of the Juels-Weis privacy model because the simulation-based privacy model does not explicitly define which is the actual target from the malicious adversary. So it is difficult to insert the honest execution to the Paise-Vaudenay privacy model Note that if we omit the honest execution in the modified model, we can easily describe an attack scenario for any symmetric key based RFID authentication protocols as in Section 4. Also note that the honest communication between the reader and tag must be executed after the anonymous communication phase is finished. Billet, Etrog and Gilbert formalized the forward privacy model such that the honest execution occurs before the anonymous communication [3] . However, their model is not achievable since such a honest execution is useless and does not prevent any of the attacks described in Section 4 (Specifically, their proposed protocol PEPS falls into a type 2a protocol and does not satisfy their privacy model).
Suitable RFID Authentication Protocols
O-FRAP
O-FRAP is an RFID authentication protocol proposed by Li, Burmester and de Medeiros in 2007 [7] . This protocol falls into type 2a and does not hold narrow-forward privacy [17] . In this paper, we show that O-FRAP satisfies the modified privacy model. Remark that O-FRAP satisfies universally composable (UC) security, but [7] does not provide any relationship between their model and other security models. So the adequateness of the UC definition and its protocol described in [7] is not investigated. Our result shows that a UC-secure protocol also holds provable security in the indistinguishability-based privacy model.
Let k be a security parameter, f : {0, 1} k × {0, 1} 2k → {0, 1} 4k be pseudorandom function and be the total number of tags in the protocol. Each tag contains its secret key sk i and nonce r 2 . The reader keeps its database {sk i , sk i.old } 1≤i≤ which contains the current and previous secret keys of each tag. The reader and a tag t i execute the following authentication. The main building block of this protocol is the challenge-response authentication with the pseudo-random function f . In addition, the reader keeps the previous secret key of each tag to resynchronize the secret key to the tag when the desynchronization occurs.
Theorem 1. Assume that f is a pseudo-random function. Then, O-FRAP satisfies the modified Juels-Weis privacy model.
Proof. Let q be a upper bound by which the RFID tag performs the key update procedure. Note that q is bounded by the adversarial oracle query and it is at most polynomial in k. S i is the event that the adversary outputs 1 in Game i.
Game 0. This is the original game between the challenger and adversary in the modified Juels-Weis privacy model.
Game 1-(i, j).
We gradually change the output of all the sessions executed in this game:
1. For any session executed between the reader and tag t i (t < i), the output of the pseudo-random function is changed with a uniformly random string over {0, 1} 4k . 2. For i-th tag t i , 2-1. When the number of key update is less than j (j < j), the output of the pseudo-random function is changed with a uniformly random string (r temp , s 2 , s 3 , sk j )
If the number of key update j holds j ≥ j, the output of the session is computed by the pseudo-random function f . 3. For any session executed between the reader and tag t i (i > i), all output and update keys are computed by the pseudo-random function.
This transformation is purely conceptual and there is no difference between these games.
Lemma 2. For all
Proof. If the adversary can distinguish the difference between Game 1-(i, j) and Game 1-(i, j + 1) with non-negligible probability, then there exists an algorithm B that breaks the security of the pseudo-random function. The only difference between these games is that the outputs come from the pseudo-random function or truly random string when the tag t i executes the sessions with j-th updated key.
The oracle queries which algorithm B can issue is either the pseudo-random function f (sk i , ·) or truly random function RF. B generates secret key of the tag except t i in the set up and simulates the session between the reader and tags. If the number of key update on t i is less than j, we set uniformly random string over {0, 1}
4k as the output of the session. Similarly, if the key update on t i is executed more than j, we computes the output with the pseudo-random function. If the number of key update on t i is j, B computes the output as follows. 4k . When the adversary sends (r 1 , r 2 , s 2 ) to the reader, B issues r 1 r 2 to the oracle and verifies the message as the protocol specification. If the verification is accepted, B set s 3 as the output of the reader. Otherwise, the output of the reader is set as s 3
k . Finally, when A outputs a bit b, B outputs the same bit.
If the pseudo-random function is given to B, the above game is equivalent to Game 1-(i, j) from the view point of the adversary A. Otherwise, the distribution of the message is the same as Game 1-(i, j + 1). Therefore we have
It is clear that 3 hold since the game transformation between them is purely conceptual (the distribution is equivalent). From these lemmas, we can transform Game 0 to Game 1-( + 1, 0). This time, all the output of the session in the last game is independently chosen and truly random. That is, the probability that A can guess which tag is selected in the anonymous communication phase is 1/2. Thanks to Execute, the secret key of the tag is completely updated and its secret key is uniformly chosen and independent from the previous sessions. Therefore the adversary can obtain no information about the past session of the tag.
Finally, we obtain Adv
The Modified OSK Protocol
The OSK Protocol is an RFID authentication protocol provided by Ohkubo et al. in 2003 and this is one of the type 1 protocols [15] . In this paper, we add the reader authentication and the roll back property for the secret key to the OSK protocol. We show that the modified protocol satisfies IND * -privacy.
Consider that k is a security parameter, g : {0, Similar to the original OSK protocol, the updated secret key is deterministically defined by the current secret key. Thus the reader can precompute this value if the reader has enough resources. Therefore the reader can find the tag's identity from its database.
Theorem 2.
If g is a pseudo-random generator and f is a pseudo-random function, the above protocol satisfies the modified Juels-Weis privacy model.
Proof. Let q be an upper bound by which the RFID tag performs the key update procedure. Note that q is bounded by the adversarial oracle query and it is at most polynomial in k. S i is the event that the adversary outputs 1 in Game i.
Game 0. This is the original attack game in the modified Juels-Weis privacy model. Game 1-i. We gradually change the output of the pseudo-random generator g as follows:
1. For any session executed between the reader and tag t i (t < i), the output of the pseudo-random generator g is changed with a uniformly random string over {0, 1} 2k . 2. For any session executed between the reader and tag t i (t ≥ i), all output and update keys are computed by the pseudo-random generator.
Game 2-(i, j).
We modify the output of the pseudo-random function f in the same fashion as O-FRAP. 
Proof. If the adversary can distinguish between Game 1-i and Game 1-(i + 1), we construct an algorithm B that breaks the security of the pseudo-random generator G (see Section 2.3).
nk+k . B computes all the secret keys of the tag except t i+1 and simulates the session as Game 1-i. The initial secret key of the tag t i is set as x 1 and the reader's secret key corresponding to the tag is x 0 . B sets (u 1 , u 2 ) as (u 1 , u 2 ) := (y j+1 , x j+2 ) when t i updated the secret key j times. When A outputs a bit b , B outputs the same bit.
If B is given pseudo-random variables, then the above game is equivalent to Game 1-i from the view point of the adversary. Otherwise, the distribution of the above game is the same as Game 1-(i + 1). Therefore we have |S
Lemma 6. We have Pr[S
1-] = Pr[S 2-(1,0) ].
Lemma 7. For any 1 ≤ i ≤ , there exists an algorithm B such that
It is clear that Lemma 4 and 6 hold since these game transformations are purely conceptual. We can easily prove Lemma 7 and 8 on the basis of the proof for Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 in a similar fashion. Finally, we obtain 
Further Separation in Concurrent Execution
The above privacy definition and other previous privacy models [11, 17, 18] assume that the RFID tag runs only one session at a time (e.g., sequential execution). However, an adversary can issue many oracle queries and interrupt the communication, so the tag may receive the message to start a new session during the execution of another session. Thus we consider the case that the RFID tag can perform the concurrent execution in this section. Of course, this situation may not practical since the resource of cheap tags is limited. Nonetheless, this situation is useful to show the gap between the type 2a and 2b protocols. While these two types of protocols contain the key update mechanism and the secret key of the tag is synchronized to the reader, the secret key input to the computation of the output message on the tag is different in the concurrent setting. Consider that (m 0 , m 1 ) is the output from the tag in the concurrent execution. In the type 2a protocols, both messages are computed with fixed secret key since the tag does not update the secret key before the reader authentication. Even when the adversary obtains an updated secret key, it is difficult to distinguish the challenge tag from these messages. On the other hand, the secret key is always updated and m 1 is computed by the updated secret key in type 2b protocols. If the adversary responds with a random message to the tag in the concurrent session, the secret key of the tag is roll backed and the adversary obtains the secret key which is used to compute m 1 . Therefore the adversary can distinguish which tag is selected in the anonymous communication phase in the type 2b protocols if we consider the concurrent setting.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we proposed a new variant of Juels-Wies privacy model that allows an adversary to issue the result and corrupt queries on the basis of the Juels-Weis privacy model. The RFID tag is quite cheap device and it is hard to implement secure module (e.g., Trusted Platform Module). Thus the secret key leakage is critical issue for RFID authentication protocol. Independently, we can observe the authentication result in many situations (automatic ticket gate, entrance of the private sector, etc). Though Ng et al. showed the separation result described in Section 4, there is a achievable security model that the adversary can obtain these information. We showed two examples and provide concrete security proof for these protocols.
